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UNITED STATES V. GRANT: A STEP IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION TO PROVIDING NON-INCORRIGIBLE JUVENILE
OFFENDERS A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR RELEASE
Samantha L. Santola*
I. INTRODUCTION
The unique characteristics of juvenile offenders that make them
inherently different from adults play a significant role under the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that juveniles have distinctive rights and
additional protections in the criminal sentencing process.1 According to the
Court, the “distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even
when they commit terrible crimes.”2 In short, the presumption for juvenile
offenders is one of second chances.
Recent legislative trends apply restrictions on sentencing juvenile
offenders.3 This goes hand in hand with trends increasing due process
protections for juveniles, adopting scientific screening and assessment tools
to structure decision-making processes, and implementing evidence-based
practices to provide treatment for youth and their families.4 The shift in
juvenile justice policy toward a focus on the developmental needs of juvenile
offenders and the encouragement of meaningful participation in the
community upon release coincides with the shift toward rehabilitation as a
more prominent juvenile justice goal.5 The Court’s four key opinions6 on
this issue largely rely on neuroscience and developmental psychology,
basing its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment on factors affecting
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See infra Part III.
2
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012).
3
See SARAH ALICE BROWN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TRENDS IN
JUVENILE JUSTICE STATE LEGISLATION: 2001–2011, 3 (2012), http://www.ncsl.org/document
s/cj/trendsinjuvenilejustice.pdf.
4
Id.
5
See id.
6
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59
(2010); Miller, 567 U.S. at 472; Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).
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adolescent development, competency, and culpability.7
As research and societal expectations continue to evolve, the Supreme
Court has continued to expand the rights of juvenile offenders and consider
appropriate sentencing procedures in light of the four historically recognized
penal justifications: deterrence, retribution, incarceration, and
rehabilitation.8 As a result of advancing Supreme Court doctrine, state and
federal courts have been presented with novel issues and arguments. In
particular, the Third Circuit recently held that: (1) lengthy term-of-years
sentences are equally unconstitutional as applied to non-incorrigible juvenile
offenders—those capable of rehabilitation and reform—and (2) sentencing
procedures must identify non-incorrigible juvenile offenders and consider
the national age of retirement, in addition to life expectancy, when
structuring a meaningful opportunity for release.9 This was a positive step
toward promoting the wellness of juvenile offenders, as well as public safety
and economic concerns of the nation as a whole. This Comment will discuss
why the Third Circuit decision was a step in the right direction and propose
theories of rehabilitation and recovery to guide better metrics for drawing
lines in rule making.
Grant and its implications are relevant not only to the Third Circuit, but
to the nation as a whole as well. The Third Circuit reheard oral argument en
banc on February 20, 2019, but has yet to issue its final opinion.10
Simultaneously, with its granting of certiorari in Mathena v. Malvo, the
Supreme Court is poised to decide whether its decision in an earlier case11
modifies a substantive rule of constitutional law such that it must be given
retroactive effect, vacating the Respondent’s sentence of life without the
possibility of parole for crimes committed at age seventeen.12 This Comment
7
It is helpful to clarify that, although courts and researchers use the term “culpability”
in this context, it is not to suggest that juveniles do not have the requisite mens rea to be
convicted of their crimes. Rather, notions of diminished culpability indicate that juveniles’
blameworthiness is diminished by the attributes of youth, such that juveniles are less
deserving of sentences that mirror the severity of sentences applied to adults who commit
similar crimes.
8
See infra Part III.
9
United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 146–48, 151 (3d Cir. 2018).
10
United States v. Grant, 905 F.3d 285, 285 (3d Cir. 2018).
11
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (holding that the Court’s decision in Miller v.
Alabama—that mandatory life without parole for those who were minors at the time of their
crime violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment—
must be given retroactive effect because it modifies a substantive rule of constitutional law.).
12
Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1317 (Mar.
18, 2019) (No. 18-217). In 2002, Malvo and another individual, Muhammad, killed ten
people in sniper attacks. Muhammad was sentenced to death and executed in 2009. Malvo,
however, was seventeen at the time of the attacks and was sentenced to life in prison. He
challenged these decisions, arguing that his sentence must be vacated because Montgomery
modified a substantive rule of constitutional law and should therefore be applied retroactively
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will discuss the specific issues of the Third Circuit’s original opinion in
Grant, but will assess broader theories in doing so in order to advocate for a
more sound sentencing doctrine.
Part II will lay out the scope of the juvenile incarceration problem. Part
III will discuss Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment
as applied to juvenile offenders. Part IV will analyze the United States v.
Grant decision and its sentencing standard that builds upon Supreme Court
precedent. Part V will evaluate how Grant was in line with the Supreme
Court doctrine and was an integral step toward a sentencing scheme that
accounts for retributivist and rehabilitative goals. Part V will further argue
for the development of a framework that provides for a screening,
assessment, and treatment model to provide non-incorrigible juvenile
offenders with a meaningful opportunity for release, and account for
economic and policy concerns surrounding incarceration. Grant develops
Supreme Court precedent, but does not go far enough given insights from
other fields related to juvenile justice.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE JUVENILE INCARCERATION PROBLEM AND MENTAL
HEALTH AMONG OFFENDERS
The United States has one of the largest prison populations in the
world.13 Despite the declining rate of juvenile incarceration, the United
States continues to incarcerate more youth and adolescents than any other
industrialized nation.14 This poses significant social and economic burdens
on the nation as a whole. On average, the United States spends $148,767 to
incarcerate one juvenile for one year in the most expensive confinement
system15—nearly thirteen times the $11,454 it invests in a single child’s
education.16 Additionally, the United States incurs between $7.90 billion
and $21.47 billion in long-term costs resulting from youth incarceration.17

to his own sentencing. Id. at 266–67.
13
VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT, (2010), https://www.sentencingproj
ect.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Deterrence-in-Criminal-Justice.pdf.
14
NELL BERNSTEIN, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE: THE END OF JUVENILE PRISON 12–13
(2016). The US incarcerates juveniles at eighteen times the rate of France, seven times the
rate of Great Britain, and five times the rate of South Africa, its closest competitor. Id.
15
AMANDA PETTERUTI, MARC SCHINDLER & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST.,
STICKER SHOCK: CALCULATING THE FULL PRICE TAG FOR YOUTH INCARCERATION 3 (Sarah E.
Baker ed., 2014).
16
STEPHEN Q. CORNMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2014–15 (FISCAL YEAR
2015) 2 (2017).
17
PETTERUTI, supra note 15. This figure includes costs of recidivism, lost future
earnings of confined youth, lost future government tax revenue, additional Medicare and
Medicaid spending, and costs of sexual assault on confined youth. Id.
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This figure pales in comparison to that of a juvenile with a mental disability.
In 2007, a study prepared for the Chief Probation Officers of California and
the California Mental Health Directors Association surveyed eighteen
counties and found that a juvenile with a mental illness can cost at least
$18,800 more than other incarcerated youth.18
More than half of all incarcerated individuals have mental health
disabilities.19 Approximately 50 to 75% of the two million youth
encountering the juvenile justice system each year20 meet criteria for a
mental health disorder, and approximately 40 to 80% of incarcerated
juveniles have at least one diagnosable mental health disorder.21
Understanding the connection between mental health and juvenile offending
is a crucial component to rehabilitation, as mental health is both directly and
indirectly linked to subsequent delinquency.22 Further, life-without-parole
(LWOP) sentences disproportionately impact the most marginalized and
vulnerable children, as juveniles who commit the most severe crimes are
significantly more likely than the general population to have been exposed
to adverse childhood experiences—75 to 93%23 versus 25 to 34%,
respectively.24 Adverse childhood experiences include physical abuse,
sexual abuse, emotional abuse, emotional neglect, physical neglect,
household substance abuse, household mental illness, parental separation,
and having an incarcerated household member.25 Research demonstrates
that exposure to trauma significantly impacts brain development and

18

EDWARD COHEN & JANE PFEIFER, CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CAL. AND CAL. MENTAL
HEALTH DIRS. ASS’N, COSTS OF INCARCERATING YOUTH WITH MENTAL ILLNESS vi (2008).
19
SAMHSA Awards Nearly $21.6 Million in Grants to Help People Transition from the
Criminal Justice System to the Community, SAMHSA (Oct. 13, 2010),
http://www.icfhinc.org/news_details.asp?news=50. [hereinafter SAMHSA Awards Grants
for Transition Services].
20
Lee A. Underwood & Aryssa Washington, Mental Illness and Juvenile Offenders, 13
INT’L J. OF ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 228, 229–30 (2016). Demographers predict that one
in three American children will be arrested by age twenty-three. Robert Brame et al.,
Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21,
25 (2012).
21
Underwood & Washington, supra note 2020, at 229–30; see also BROWN, supra note
3, at 8.
22
Underwood & Washington, supra note 2020, at 230.
23
Michelle Evans-Chase, Addressing Trauma and Psychosocial Development in
Juvenile Justice-Involved Youth: A Synthesis of the Developmental Neuroscience, Juvenile
Justice and Trauma Literature, 3 LAWS 744, 745 (2014). Among children sentenced to
LWOP, 79% have witnessed violence in their homes, almost 46.9% have been physically
abused, and 20.5% have been sexually abused. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE
LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 2 (2012).
24
THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF
STATES ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 8 (2018).
25
Id.
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chemistry26 and is associated with a lessened capacity for emotional selfregulation, increased violent behavior,27 increased impulsive behavior,
increased risk-taking behavior, and decreased self-control.28
Both the prefrontal cortex of the brain, which controls executive
functioning, and the limbic system, which processes emotions, rewards, and
punishments, continue to develop through adolescence.29 Eighteen is “the
peak age for criminal behavior, and 90[%] of all juvenile offenders desist
from crime by their mid-[twenties], evidencing likely rehabilitation for
children and teenagers who commit serious crimes.”30 Thus, “while the
impacts of trauma provide critical context for children who commit serious
crimes, the plasticity of children’s brains makes them especially amenable
to rehabilitation, therapy, and positive growth.”31
Offenders with mental health and substance use disorders have
difficulty accessing quality behavioral health services due to a lack of health
care, job skills, education, stable housing, and connections with community
behavioral health providers.32 Most juvenile justice systems do not have the
facilities to properly screen or treat youth with mental health disorders; risks
of victimization, self-injury, and suicide are high among those who become
incarcerated.33 Further preventing access to needed services jeopardizes
recovery and increases the likelihood of relapse or re-arrest.34 As a result of
this realization, state policies have had an increased focus on providing
proper screening, assessment, and treatment services for young offenders
with mental health needs.35 Still, only about one-third of state prisoners and
26

Michael T. Baglivio et al., The Prevalence of Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE)
in the Lives of Juvenile Offenders, 3 J. JUV. JUST. 3 (2014).
27
Evans-Chase, supra note 2323, at 745.
28
Annette Streeck-Fischer et al., Down Will Come Baby, Cradle and All: Diagnostic and
Therapeutic Implications of Chronic Trauma on Child Development, 34 AUSTL. & N.Z. J.
PSYCHOL. 903, 915 (2000).
29
LAURENCE STEINBERG, AGE OF OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF
ADOLESCENCE 70 (2014).
30
THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF
STATES ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 4 (2018) (citing
ELIZABETH SCOTT ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE
SENTENCING 7 (2015)).
31
Id.
32
Reentry Resources for Individuals, Providers, Communities, and States, SAMHSA
(Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/topics/criminal_juvenile_justice/r
eentry-resource
s-for-consumers-providers-communities-states.pdf. [Hereinafter Reentry Resources].
33
NAT’L MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT FOR YOUTH IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A COMPENDIUM OF PROMISING PRACTICES 3 (2004).
34
Id. at 1.
35
BROWN, supra note 3, at 8, 10 (providing highlights of significant juvenile mental
health laws in Arizona, Connecticut, California, Georgia, New Jersey, Colorado, Montana,
Tennessee, and Iowa).
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one-sixth of local jail inmates with mental health disabilities have received
treatment since admission.36
This poses a significant barrier to rehabilitation and the opportunity to
prove that an inmate is capable of reform and thus deserving of release.
Without sufficient services and treatment programs, offenders will continue
to demonstrate symptoms that affect behavior and hinder rehabilitation. For
example, rule violations and injuries from physical altercations are more
common among inmates with mental health diagnoses.37 Additionally,
offenders that serve longer sentences are more likely to become
institutionalized, lose supportive contacts in the community, and become
removed from recovery opportunities; each of these considerations promote
recidivism.38 Retributivism appropriately stresses the notion that criminal
offenders deserve punishments proportional to the crimes committed and the
circumstances surrounding each offense. Rehabilitative goals, however,
must work in collaboration with retributivist notions to lessen the detrimental
effects of incarceration of juvenile offenders, both on the individual
offenders and on society as a whole.
III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: HOW IT APPLIES TO JUVENILE OFFENDERS
Adolescence is a period of heightened neuroplasticity, meaning that the
brain has a heightened capacity for positive change.39 This is the foundation
for the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment and
applying its protections to juvenile offenders, as the Court recognized that a
child’s traits are less fixed than an adult’s.40
A. Supreme Court Cases Interpreting the Eighth Amendment and
Establishing Guidelines for Sentencing Juvenile Offenders
The Eighth Amendment demands adherence to these familiar words:
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.”41 Under the Eighth Amendment, “the
State must respect the human attributes even of those who have committed

36
DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, NCJ 213600, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL
INMATES (2006).
37
Id.
38
Wright, supra note 1313, at 7.
39
Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC
DISEASE & TREATMENT 449, 451 (2013); ELIZABETH SCOTT ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE SENTENCING 9 (2015).
40
See e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 72 (2010).
41
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

SANTOLA (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

11/15/2019 7:29 PM

COMMENT

595

serious crimes.”42 Further, to determine whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual, courts must account for societal changes.43 “The concept of
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.”44 The punishment
should be graduated and proportional to the offense committed.45
In 2005, the Supreme Court addressed whether the death penalty was
an appropriate sentence for a seventeen-year-old boy who planned and
committed murder in the first degree.46 Despite evidence that the murder
was “wantonly vile,”47 the Roper v. Simmons opinion recognized that
children and adolescents are inherently different than adults, and granted
juveniles additional constitutional protections under the Eighth
Amendment.48 Therefore, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s ban
against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits juveniles from being
sentenced to death for crimes they committed before age eighteen.49 The
Court cited studies evidencing that only a small portion of adolescents who
engage in illegal activity develop fixed patterns of criminal behavior.50
Because adolescents’ brains are not fully developed, mental abilities such as
self-control and the ability to take responsibility for one’s actions are
affected.51 The Court further found an existing “consensus” in society that
juveniles are not as blameworthy as adults guilty of similar crimes,52 noting
that “[r]etribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is
imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”53 The Court relied
upon evidence that the majority of States rejected the juvenile death penalty,
and the punishment was infrequently used even where it remained a viable
punishment.54 Thus, the Court held that the “differences between juvenile
and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a
youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient
culpability.”55
42

Graham, 560 U.S. at 59.
Id. at 58.
44
Id. at 59.
45
Id.
46
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557–60 (2005).
47
Id. at 557.
48
Id. at 561–62.
49
Id. at 578.
50
Id. at 570 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
51
See id. at 569–70.
52
Roper, 543 U.S. at 567.
53
Id. at 571.
54
Id. at 567.
55
Id. at 572–73.
43
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In 2010, the Supreme Court again expanded the doctrine promulgated
in Roper when a sixteen-year-old boy was charged as an adult, pleaded guilty
to armed burglary with assault and attempted battery, and received the
maximum sentence of life imprisonment without parole.56 In Graham v.
Florida, the court sentenced the adolescent offender to the maximum
sentence on each charge, which was life imprisonment for armed burglary
and fifteen years for attempted armed robbery.57 “Because Florida ha[d]
abolished its parole system. . . a life sentence [allowed] no possibility of
release.”58 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the imposition of LWOP
on a juvenile offender for a non-homicide crime constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment, and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.59
None of the recognized goals of penal sanctions—retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation—provided an adequate justification for
such a sentence.60 Significantly, the Court further held that while the Eighth
Amendment does not require a State to release an offender during his
lifetime, it must provide each individual with “some meaningful opportunity
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”61 It
could not be conclusively determined at the time of sentencing that the
juvenile offender would be a danger to society for the rest of his life.62
The categorical rule developed by the Graham decision provides all
juvenile non-homicide offenders “a chance to demonstrate maturity and
reform,” as they should not be deprived of hope, the chance for fulfillment
outside prison walls, the chance for reconciliation with society, or “the
opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human
worth and potential.”63 The Court noted that international opinion also
weighs overwhelmingly against LWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses
committed by juveniles.64 Determining that a juvenile offender will continue
to be a danger to society throughout his life is determining that the juvenile
is “incorrigible.”65 Incorrigibility, however, is “inconsistent with youth.”66
“Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation for
56

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 57 (2010).
Id. at 57. The sentencing judge tried the juvenile offender as an adult, reasoning that
the adolescent’s escalating pattern of criminal conduct suggested that deviant behavior would
continue throughout his life, and the court should try to protect the community from the
defendant’s future criminal actions. Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 81–82.
60
Id. at 71.
61
Id. at 75.
62
Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.
63
Id. at 79.
64
Id. at 81 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005)).
65
Id. at 72.
66
Id. at 73 (quoting Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. App. 1968).
57
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remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation.”67 Inmates not eligible for parole
consideration are often deprived of counseling, education, and rehabilitation
programs.68 Thus, a LWOP sentence improperly denied the offender an
opportunity to demonstrate growth, maturity, and rehabilitation.69
Shortly after Graham, the Supreme Court expanded upon this doctrine
yet again in Miller v. Alabama, where two fourteen-year-old boys were
convicted of murder and sentenced to LWOP.70 This “landmark”71 decision
announced that mandatory LWOP sentencing schemes for juvenile offenders
are unconstitutional violations of the Eighth Amendment.72 The Court
reasoned that allowing such sentencing schemes to exist poses too great a
risk of disproportionate punishment.73 Punishment must be appropriate to
the crime committed, and proportionality must take into account “the
mitigating qualities of youth.”74 The Court found fault in such mandatory
sentencing schemes, noting that the decision-maker who originally
sentenced the two defendants had no discretion to impose different
punishments because state law mandated that each juvenile serve a LWOP
sentence, “even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth and its
attendant characteristics, along with the nature of this crime, made a lesser
sentence . . . more appropriate.”75
The Court’s rationale originated from the previous Roper and Graham
decisions. A mandatory LWOP sentencing scheme prevents consideration
of an offender’s “lessened culpability” and greater “capacity for change”76
by precluding consideration of an offender’s age and its “hallmark” features,
such as immaturity, impulsiveness, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences77—qualities that make youth less culpable for their crimes.78
Mandatory LWOP schemes prevent sentencing courts from taking into
account the family and surrounding environment from which a juvenile
offender cannot usually extricate himself.79 The mandatory sentencing
practice in Miller forced the sentencing court to neglect the circumstances of
the homicide offense, including the extent of the offender’s participation in
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 79.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.
Id. at 73.
567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
BROWN, supra note 3, at 4.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 502 (2012).
Id. at 479.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 465.
Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 74 (2010)).
Id. at 477.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 72).
Id. at 477.
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the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.80
The Court further noted that mandatory LWOP schemes also ignore that an
offender might have been convicted of a lesser crime if not for attributes
related to maturity associated with youth, such as the inability to deal with
police officers or prosecutors, to negotiate a plea agreement, or to assist
defense attorneys.81 This puts youth at a significant disadvantage in criminal
proceedings.82 Courts must examine all circumstances of a case, including
youth and its attendant characteristics, in order to initiate an appropriate
sentence.83 Thus, mandatory LWOP sentencing schemes that apply to
juvenile offenders violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.84
In 2016, the Montgomery v. Louisiana held that, because the Miller
decision declared a new substantive rule of constitutional law, it thus applies
retroactively on collateral review.85 This does not mean that states must resentence each offender.86 Rather, states may remedy Miller violations by
considering juvenile homicide offenders for parole.87
B. How Other Courts Apply the Graham and Miller Doctrine
Several circuit courts have similarly applied the Graham and Miller
doctrine to cases of de facto LWOP sentences—those which are not
technically mandatory but are functionally mandatory. 88 In McKinley v.
Butler, the Seventh Circuit applied Miller to invalidate a de facto life
sentence in the form of a 100-year sentence with no chance of early release
imposed on a non-incorrigible juvenile offender.89 The court emphasized the
importance of the logic behind Miller’s finding that children are inherently
different than adults, and held that this consideration “cannot logically be
limited to de jure life sentences, as distinct from sentences denominated in
numbers of years yet highly likely to result in imprisonment for life.”90 The
Seventh Circuit further stated that this logic applies whether or not the
legislature has made the life sentence discretionary or mandatory, holding
that “even discretionary life sentences must be guided by consideration of

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id.
Id. at 477–78.
Id. at 478 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 78).
Id. at 477, 483.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 465.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).
Id. at 736.
Id.
See e.g., McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 911.
Id.
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age-relevant factors.”91 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit applied Graham to hold
a 254-year sentence unconstitutional on the grounds that both LWOP and de
facto LWOP “deny the juvenile the chance to return to society.”92 The
sentence was deemed “irreconcilable with Graham’s mandate that a juvenile
nonhomicide offender must be provided with ‘some meaningful opportunity’
to reenter society.”93 The court noted that Graham’s focus was not on the
label of a “life sentence,” but “rather on the difference between life in prison
with, or without, possibility of parole.”94 The Tenth Circuit ruled similarly
in Budder v. Addison, holding that a sentence of 155 years violated the
Eighth Amendment under Graham.95 “Graham addressed any sentence that
would deny a juvenile nonhomicide offender a realistic opportunity to obtain
release, regardless of the label a state places on that sentence.”96 The court
refused to permit states to escape Graham’s categorical rule merely because
a punishment is not labeled “life without parole.”97
District and state courts have also followed suit, recognizing that there
is no meaningful difference between a mandatory LWOP sentence and a
sentence styled as a mere mandatory term of years that effectively obtains
the same result.98 For example, State v. Null held that “[t]he prospect of
geriatric release, if one is to be afforded the opportunity for release at all,
does not provide a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to demonstrate the ‘maturity
and rehabilitation’ required to obtain release and reenter society as required
by Graham.”99 The court reasoned that the Miller doctrine is neither crimespecific nor punishment-specific, as the notions “that ‘children are different’
and that they are categorically less culpable than adult offenders apply as
fully in this case [involving a lengthy term-of-years sentence] as in any
other.”100 “After the juvenile’s transient impetuosity ebbs and the juvenile
matures and reforms, the incapacitation objective can no longer seriously be
served, and the statutorily mandated delay of parole” purposelessly causes
91

Id.
Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 75 (2010)).
93
Id. at 1194 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).
94
Id. at 1192. The court noted that “‘there are no constitutionally significant
distinguishable facts’ between Graham’s and Moore’s sentences.” Id. at 1191 (quoting Cudio
v. Ayers, 698 F.3d 752, 763 (9th Cir. 2012)).
95
851 F.3d 1047, 1059 (10th Cir. 2017).
96
Id. at 1053 n.4.
97
Id. at 1056.
98
See e.g., State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013).
99
836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)).
100
Id. (holding that all mandatory minimum sentences imprisoning juvenile offenders are
unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of Iowa’s state constitution
because mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles are too punitive and inhibit the
rehabilitative ideal).
92
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continued pain and suffering.101 Similarly, Funchess v. Prince held that
Louisiana’s parole procedure did “little in the way of actually making parole
a possibility” and, as such, did not provide a meaningful opportunity for
release under Miller.102 State v. Pearson went a step further and held that a
thirty-five-year sentence without the possibility of parole “violates the core
teachings of Miller,”103 “effectively depriv[ing] [the defendant] of any
chance of an earlier release and the possibility of leading a more normal adult
life.”104 One judge opined that “limiting the techniques and protections of
these recent cases to only the harshest penalties known to law is as illogical
as it is unjust.”105 The court further directed sentencing courts to consider
rehabilitation106 as well as the mitigating features of youth pursuant to Miller
when sentencing juvenile offenders.107 More recently, People v. Holman
held that both mandatory and discretionary life sentences for juvenile
offenders are disproportionate and unconstitutional, unless mitigating factors
such as youth and its attendant characteristics are appropriately considered
at the time of sentencing.108 The Supreme Court of Illinois stated that a
juvenile offender may be sentenced to LWOP “only if the trial court
determines that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity,
permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of
rehabilitation.”109
Today, a majority of states ban LWOP sentences for children or have
no one serving the sentence.110 Since the Court decided Montgomery in
2016, the number of individuals serving LWOP for offenses committed as
children has been reduced by 60% because of judicial advances and

101
State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 400 (Iowa 2014) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977)).
102
No. 14-2105, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23131, at *15 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2016) (holding
that, because of these obstacles, the sentencing court imposed what amounted to a mandatory
life sentence with no meaningful opportunity to obtain release, regardless that the prisoner
would be eligible for parole in 40 years).
103
836 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013).
104
Id.
105
Id. at 98 (Cady, C.J., concurring).
106
Id. at 97. “To predict that a juvenile cannot be rehabilitated is very difficult.” Id.
107
Id.
108
91 N.E.3d 849, 861 (Ill. 2017).
109
Id. at 863.
110
The number of states that do not allow LWOP to be imposed on children has increased
from five states in 2012 to twenty-six states and the District of Columbia in 2019. States That
Ban Life Without Parole for Children, THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH,
https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org/mediaresources/states-that-ban-life/ (last visited Feb.
15, 2019). In at least six additional states (Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New
York, and Rhode Island), no one is serving LWOP for an offense committed as a child. THE
CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF STATES
ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 5, 12 n.18 (2018).
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legislative reform,111 and for those whose LWOP sentences have been
reformed as a result, the median sentence nationwide is twenty-five years
before parole or release eligibility, which means that “most individuals who
were sentenced to die in prison as children now have an opportunity for
release, but they will not be eligible for a review opportunity or release until
they are at least in their [forties] or older.”112 This demonstrates that states
are beginning to move in the right direction to provide opportunities for
release at younger ages; yet, many individuals are still serving lengthy
sentences that may not allow or effectively provide for meaningful reentry
into society, especially since there remains a lack of a rehabilitation focus to
promote wellness, recovery, and meaningful participation in the community.
IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROACH: UNITED STATES V. GRANT
Following the Supreme Court’s direction, the Third Circuit focused
squarely on the plight of non-incorrigible juvenile offenders facing
constructively LWOP sentences—a result that Miller and Graham suggest is
rarely permissible.113 In response to issues surrounding de facto LWOP, the
Third Circuit approached de facto LWOP as equally unconstitutional in light
of Supreme Court doctrine.114 Despite its allegedly horrific facts, United
States v. Grant attempted to effectuate Supreme Court doctrine, examining
the constitutionality of lengthy term-of-year sentences and the contours of
the an offender’s right to a meaningful opportunity for release.115 In Grant,
Corey Grant, a member of an organized gang of teenagers called the E-Port
Posse, was convicted of RICO conspiracy, racketeering,116 various drug
trafficking charges, and possession of a weapon in relation to a crime of
violence or drug trafficking—crimes committed between ages thirteen and
sixteen.117 Although “the District Court determined that Grant’s upbringing,

111

THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF
STATES ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 6 (2018). Still, children
continue to receive LWOP at a disproportionate rate in several jurisdictions. Id. at 7.
112
Id. at 6.
113
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72–73
(2010).
114
United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2018).
115
See generally United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2018).
116
As predicates for the racketeering charge, a jury found that Grant murdered one
individual and attempted to murder another. Id. at 136. On one occasion, Grant encountered
a group of rival drug dealers while delivering drugs for the E-Port Posse and confronted a
former member of the E-Port Posse, Dion Lee; Grant and an associate shot Dion in the leg.
Id. Later that month, Grant encountered Dion’s brother, Mario, another independent drug
dealer who was warned not to operate within the Posse’s territory. Id. Grant confronted
Mario, who began to retreat. Id. Grant ordered his associate to shoot Mario to prevent escape,
and the associate killed Mario. Id.
117
Id. at 134–35.
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debilitating characteristics of youth, and post-conviction record
demonstrated that he had the capacity to reform and that a LWOP sentence
was therefore inappropriate under Miller,” Grant received a term of sixtyfive years without parole.118 Grant challenged the constitutionality of this
sentence, contending that he would be released at age seventy-two at the
earliest—the same age as his life expectancy—which “constitutes de facto
LWOP and therefore fails to account for his capacity for reform and to afford
him a meaningful opportunity for release.”119
Relying on the Supreme Court doctrine as established, the Third Circuit
extended Miller, holding that a term-of-years sentence that meets or exceeds
the life-expectancy of a non-incorrigible juvenile offender violates the
Eighth Amendment.120 For the same reasons that mandatory LWOP
sentences are unconstitutional as applied to children and adolescents, the
court found de facto LWOP sentences inherently disproportionate for
juveniles still capable of reform.121 Three considerations led the court to its
conclusion: (1) Miller reserves the sentence of LWOP only for permanently
incorrigible juvenile homicide offenders; (2) the Supreme Court’s
justifications for its position on LWOP sentences apply equally to de facto
LWOP sentences; and (3) de facto LWOP sentences are irreconcilable with
the Graham and Miller requirement that non-incorrigible juvenile offenders
be provided with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”122 De facto LWOP sentences
“cannot possibly provide a meaningful opportunity for release” because the
offender effectively spends the rest of his life in prison, prevented from ever
reentering society.123
Like the de jure LWOP sentence, a de facto LWOP sentence lacks
proportionality.124 Each consideration supporting the Graham decision
applies with equal strength to the Third Circuit’s treatment of nonincorrigible juvenile offenders.125 These include “the impotence of deterring
juveniles, the shortcomings of retribution as a result of diminished
culpability, the increased opportunity for reform that vitiates incapacitation,
and the irreconcilable tension between LWOP sentences and
rehabilitation.”126 As a result of this decision, the court instructed sentencing
118

Id. at 135.
Id.
120
Id. at 142.
121
Grant, 887 F.3d at 142.
122
Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)); see also Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
123
Id. at 145.
124
Id. at 143–44.
125
Id. at 144.
126
Id.
119
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judges to conduct individualized evidentiary hearings to determine each nonincorrigible homicide offender’s life expectancy before sentencing the
individual to a term-of-years sentence that may meet or exceed his
mortality.127 A constitutional punishment must “fit[] the offender and not
merely the crime.”128
The Third Circuit further held that the national age of retirement, in
addition to a juvenile offender’s life expectancy, must be considered as a
sentencing factor in order to properly structure a meaningful opportunity for
release.129 “Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance
for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with
society, no hope.”130 Similarly, hope for the potential of only a few years in
the community is not an appropriate standard for a meaningful opportunity
for release.131 To effectuate this opinion, the Grant Court sought to develop
a legal framework to carry out the Supreme Court doctrine by providing
guidance for giving minimum constitutional protections.132 Structuring a
meaningful opportunity for release must begin with a factual determination
of the juvenile offender’s life expectancy so that an offender who is capable
of reform is not sentenced to a term-of-years beyond his expected
mortality.133 This will also allow sentencing courts to calculate the amount
of time the offender will have to reenter society after an opportunity for
release.134
Next, sentencing courts must “shape a sentence that properly accounts
for a meaningful opportunity for release,” which must provide for hope, a
chance for fulfillment outside of incarceration, reconciliation with society,
and the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of
human potential.135 This poses the issue of determining at what age an
offender should be able to meaningfully reenter society. 136 Because society
accepts the national age of retirement as “a transitional life stage where an
individual permanently leaves the work force after having contributed to
society over the course of his or her working life,” the Third Circuit

127
Grant, 887 F.3d at 149. “Critically, in addition to actuarial tables, lower courts should
consider any evidence made available by the parties that bears on the offender’s mortality,
such as medical examinations, medical records, family medical history, and pertinent expert
testimony.” Id. at 150.
128
Id. at 150 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
129
Id. at 153.
130
Id. at 147 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010)).
131
Id. at 148.
132
Id. at 148–49.
133
Grant, 887 F.3d at 149.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 150 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010)).
136
Id.
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mandated that sentencing processes consider the national age of retirement
as an additional factor for sentencing determinations.137
This decision furthers the individualized sentencing approach
promulgated in Miller,138 which requires consideration of a juvenile
offender’s age and its attendant characteristics that diminish culpability, in
order to determine whether or not LWOP is a proportionate sentence.139
Miller determined that sentencing a child to LWOP is excessive for all but
the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”140
For the majority of juvenile offenders, whose crimes instead reflect the
“transient immaturity”141 of youth, LWOP is an unconstitutional penalty.
For the same reasons, de facto LWOP that provides a non-incorrigible
juvenile offender with little or no time to meaningfully engage in society
outside of incarceration—due to a term-of-years sentence that ends close to
the offender’s life expectancy—should also be recognized as penalty in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
V. GRANT: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR NON-INCORRIGIBLE
JUVENILE OFFENDERS
United States v. Grant is consistent with Supreme Court doctrine. But
where Grant falls short is in its range of analysis surrounding incorrigibility
and juveniles’ capability for reform. Moving forward, courts should
consider the interaction of retributive and rehabilitative ideals to construct
individualized sentences relating to key recovery themes, principles for
effective treatment programs, and vocational rehabilitation.
A. Grant is Consistent with the Established Supreme Court Doctrine
Notably, the Supreme Court based its decisions not only on common
sense—on what “any parent knows”—but on science and social science
realities as well.142 The evidence supporting the Roper and Graham
decisions has become more strongly supported by research in developmental

137

Id. at 150–51.
Id. at 141.
139
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 474 n.6. (2012).
140
Id. at 479–80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
141
Graham, 560 U.S. at 72–73. The phrase “transient immaturity” is not used to
minimize the severity of crimes committed. Rather, it is used to emphasize that the signature
qualities of youth are transient (temporary); dominating characteristics such as recklessness
and impulsivity subside with maturity. “Only a relatively small proportion of adolescents
who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior
that persists into adulthood.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (quoting Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth
S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished
Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
142
Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
138
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psychology and neuroscience, which demonstrates that “adolescent brains
are not yet fully mature in regions and systems related to higher-order
executive functions such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk
avoidance.”143 The retribution rationale of the criminal justice system relates
to a person’s blameworthiness. Therefore, although sentences should reflect
the severity of the crime committed, the case for retribution is weaker for
minors than for adults.144 Similarly, deterrence is less effective because the
characteristics that render youth less culpable than adults also render youth
less likely to consider consequences.145
With this, the Miller Court took the notion of distinguishing between
incorrigible and non-incorrigible offenders one step further than the Graham
decision, noting that rehabilitation similarly could not justify a mandatory
sentence of LWOP.146 The Miller decision retained the distinction between
homicide and non-homicide offenses committed by youth; while Graham
established a flat ban for non-homicide offenses, the Miller decision called
for individualized sentencing for homicide offenses,147 holding that the
Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates LWOP for
juvenile offenders.148 Significantly, “[e]ven if a court considers a child’s age
before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates
the Eighth Amendment for a child” capable of reform. 149 Miller does not
foreclose a judge’s ability to make the judgment, in homicide cases, that a
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption deserves a
LWOP sentence.150 The Supreme Court doctrine, however, does require
judges to take into account how children are different, and how those
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in
prison without an opportunity to meaningfully reenter and participate within
the community.151
In accordance with the Supreme Court doctrine, the Grant decision
similarly does not bar judges from utilizing discretion to direct sentences,
including LWOP or lengthy term-of-years sentences. Such sentences may
be constitutional under extreme circumstances as applied to non-incorrigible

143
Id. at 471 n.5 (quoting Brief for the American Psychological Association et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos.
10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Brief for APA]).
144
Id. at 472 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 71).
145
Id. (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 72).
146
Id. at 472–73.
147
Id. at 474 n.6.
148
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.
149
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).
150
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80.
151
Id. at 480.
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juvenile offenders.152 The Grant decision merely fleshes out the Supreme
Court doctrine to further direct sentencing decision-makers charged with the
responsibility of determining how to frame a meaningful opportunity for
release. In its Petition for Rehearing, the government argued that the Grant
Court’s identification of retirement age was arbitrary and an issue for the
legislature.153 The court, however, adopted only a rebuttable presumption
that juvenile offenders capable of rehabilitation and reform should be
afforded opportunities for release before the national age of retirement; it did
not adopt a “hard and fast rule.”154 This was necessary “to give life to the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Graham and Miller.”155
The Third Circuit ensured that lower courts retain discretion “to depart
from [this presumption] in the exceptional circumstances where a juvenile
offender is found to be capable of reform but the [United States Code] factors
still favor a sentence beyond the national age of retirement.”156 The court
made clear that such instances will be rare and unusual, but relied on the
strengths that district courts possess to provide for individualized sentencing
when prudence calls for a departure from this presumption, so long as “their
departure is consistent with Miller’s Eighth Amendment guarantee for a
meaningful opportunity for release.”157
Additionally, as Grant argued on appeal, consideration of the national
age of retirement was only one component of a thoughtful framework, which
also included consideration of life expectancy, any factors set forth in
relevant statutes and legal standards, and the need to provide a chance for
“fulfillment outside prison walls” based on the unique facts of each case.158
The court’s line-drawing was not without logic, as retirement is a late
transitional point that society accepts as providing an “opportunity . . . to
attend to other endeavors in life.”159 This line therefore permits long
sentences that retributivism deems applicable in view of the severity of the
crime committed, while ensuring the requisite chance for fulfillment outside
prison walls.
Indeed, the Grant Court conceded that there is no “precise line”
marking “at what age [an offender is] still able to meaningfully reenter
society,” and therefore failed to provide courts and sentencing decision-

152

United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 152 (3d Cir. 2018).
Petition for Rehearing En Banc by Appellee the United States of America at 15, United
States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2018) (No. 16-3829).
154
Grant, 887 F.3d at 152.
155
Id.
156
Id. (emphasis added).
157
Id. at 152–53.
158
Id. at 150–51 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 79) (emphasis added).
159
Grant, 887 F.3d at 150.
153
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makers with clear guidelines.160 But the Third Circuit’s ruling is consistent
with Supreme Court doctrine, which suggests individualized assessments.
As such, the Grant decision gave standards, but not clear rules, because the
Supreme Court has implied that these are necessary to account for the
uniqueness of juveniles. Just as other courts have applied the Miller doctrine
to cases of de facto LWOP, the Grant decision appropriately applied the
same logic to cases of de facto LWOP, while building upon the framework
to incorporate consideration of the age of retirement in order to effectuate
the Supreme Court’s instruction that courts effectively provide nonincorrigible juveniles with a “realistic” and “meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”161
B. What’s Deserved and What’s to Come: Grant is Grounded in
Sound Policy Logic Behind Retribution and Rehabilitation
Sentencing and Reentry Theories
According to one Bureau of Justice Statistics study, approximately 63%
of prisoners will be rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor, and 41%
will be sent back to prison within three years.162 This “revolving door” has
led to substantial reconsideration of the reentry process.163 “In 2015, federal
efforts focused on reentry services and supports for justice-involved
individuals with mental and substance use disorders have driven an
expansion of programs and services.”164 For example, because incarceration
worsens the problems that often contribute to juvenile crime, increases the
odds of recidivism, and undermines public safety in the long term, “[m]odels
exist—carefully designed and extensively studied—that improve the
prospects of virtually all juvenile offenders, including the most serious,”165
by providing a relationship-focused network of support and supervision.166
Incorporating sentencing and reentry procedures that ensure punishment for
wrongdoing, yet do so in a more humane manner, can benefit the nation’s
overall wellness, economy, and public safety.
Research indicates that a punitive focus fails to adequately address both
public safety and economic concerns in addition to the rehabilitation needs

160

Id.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,
479 (2012).
162
Doris Layton Mackenzie, Sentencing and Corrections in the 21st Century: Setting the
Stage for the Future, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE 52–53 (2001),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189106-2.pdf.
163
Id. at 36.
164
Reentry Resources, supra note 32.
165
NELL BERNSTEIN, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE 10 (2016).
166
Id.
161
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of offenders.167 Criminological research has determined that deterrent
effects of the criminal justice system demonstrate that the certainty of
punishment is more effective than the severity of punishment.168 Research
indicates that reduced sentences may reduce recidivism rates.169 These
findings suggest that the deterrent effect of lengthy prison terms will not be
diminished if sentences are reduced.170 In fact, they suggest that shorter
punishments reduce rates of criminal behavior and recidivism. Thus, there
should instead be a greater focus on rehabilitation, particularly in the juvenile
population, as youth are more capable of reform. Freeing up resources
devoted to incarceration would allow for an increase in services that focus
on prevention and treatment.171
Public opinion regarding the juvenile justice system has been shifting
from a punitive approach toward a rehabilitative model of care, as evidenced
by recent legislative trends and the shift in juvenile courts.172 The mental
health services typically offered, however, are often inadequate or
unavailable due to insufficient resources, inadequate administrative capacity,
lack of appropriate staffing, and lack of staff training.173 Rehabilitation is
crucial to effective reintegration into society and to seeking fulfillment
outside prison walls. Charging and sentencing juveniles as adults hinders
rehabilitative objectives. “The rising number of juvenile prosecutions in the
adult criminal courts conflicts with the basic philosophy of the juvenile
justice system: that juvenile offenders, given the appropriate treatment and
support, are capable of rehabilitation.”174 Treating juveniles as adults
removes the opportunity for rehabilitation, focusing on punishment instead.
Offenders serving LWOP sentences are often denied access to
vocational and other rehabilitation services available to other inmates.175 For
juvenile offenders, “the absence of rehabilitative opportunities or treatment
makes the disproportionality of the sentence . . . all the more evident.”176
The Graham Court held that it could not be conclusively determined at the
time of sentencing that a juvenile offender would be a danger to society for

167

Id. at 236–37.
Wright, supra note 13, at 1.
169
Id. at 7.
170
Id. at 9.
171
Id.
172
Underwood & Washington, supra note 20, at 229.
173
Id.
174
Robert Anthonsen, Furthering the Goal of Juvenile Rehabilitation, 13 J. GENDER,
RACE & JUST. 729, 730 (2010) (quoting Gail B. Goodman, Arrested Development: An
Alternative to Juveniles Serving Life Without Parole in Colorado, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1059,
1084 (2007)).
175
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
176
Id.
168
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the rest of his life, and a sentence of LWOP improperly denied the offender
a chance to demonstrate growth, maturity, and rehabilitation. Relying on
these principles, the Grant Court created a framework for sentencing courts
to consider to further these objectives and to ensure a meaningful opportunity
for release based upon demonstrated rehabilitation. In doing so, the Grant
Court recognized that, in many circumstances, a sentence beyond the age of
retirement similarly denies an offender who is no longer a danger to society,
and who demonstrates maturity and rehabilitation, the opportunity to
meaningfully reenter and participate within the community. Therefore,
concepts of rehabilitation and retribution should work hand in hand
throughout sentencing to ensure that each sentence reflects the severity of
the crime, yet provides sufficient opportunity for each individual to
demonstrate the ability for reform.
Significantly, despite the severe decrease in educational opportunities
available to incarcerated youth, more than 66% aspire to higher education
and 88% aspire to maintain steady employment in the future.177 This
statistic, as well as research supporting juveniles’ neurological capacity for
recovery and growth, supports the integration of services, such as vocational
rehabilitation, to effectuate successful reentry and promote meaningful
opportunities to participate within the community. Incarceration, therefore,
should not be the default response to juvenile crime. When incarceration is
appropriate, however, a sentencing scheme that considers the age of
retirement,178 in conjunction with vocational rehabilitation services, offers
hope that juvenile offenders will dedicate time to achieving their educational
and employment goals within the community.
Juvenile offenders are most in need of, and most receptive to,
rehabilitation.179 Research that attempts to identify and understand traits that
explain criminal behavior and shed light on interventions that positively
modify behavior is premised upon theories of learning, cognition, and human
development.180 “Although there is still some debate about the effectiveness
of rehabilitation, recent literature reviews and meta-analyses demonstrate
that rehabilitation can effectively change some offenders and reduce their
criminal activities.”181 These reviews reveal that 48% to 86% of studies
examining rehabilitation programs reported treatment effectiveness, and
identified which treatment programs are more effective than others.182

177
178
179
180
181
182

BERNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 16.
Namely, Grant’s step in the right direction.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
Mackenzie, supra note 162, at 25.
Id.
Id.
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C. The Uniqueness of Juveniles and Miller’s Proportionality Rule:
Why Rehabilitation and Retribution as the Primary Penological
Goals Produce a Sounder Doctrine
1. Key Recovery Themes, Four Basic Principles for Effective
Treatment Programs, and Vocational Rehabilitation
Recovery is a process of change through which individuals improve
health and wellness, live self-directed lives, and strive to reach their full
potential.183 According to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration (SAMHSA), the agency within the United States Department
of Health and Human Services that leads public health efforts to advance the
country’s behavioral health, recovery-oriented services are built on access to
evidence-based clinical treatment and support services, which help
individuals successfully manage mental health conditions.184 The value of
recovery is widely accepted by the United States Surgeon General, the
Institute of Medicine, and other organizations.185
Recovery focuses on four dimensions: health, home, purpose, and
community.186 Helping individuals learn to manage symptoms and make
informed choices that support physical and emotional well-being is essential
to meeting health goals.187 Services should also focus on the importance of
having a stable and safe place to live, as well as having relationships that
provide support, love, and hope.188 Crucial to the Grant decision and its
implications on services for offenders in pursuance of a meaningful
opportunity for release, however, is the recovery goal of having a purpose in
life. The concept of purpose is unique to each individual; a person’s purpose
may consist of engaging in meaningful daily activities such as work, school,
volunteering, family caretaking, or creative activities.189 Crucial to
achieving and maintaining purpose is independence, income, and accessible
resources to participate in society.190
“Hope is the foundation of recovery,”191 and, as the Grant Court
indicated—in keeping with the Supreme Court’s rationale—juvenile
offenders should not be deprived of hope that they will demonstrate the

183

Recovery and Recovery Support, SAMHSA, https://www.samhsa.gov/recovery (last
updated Jan. 15, 2019). [Hereinafter Recovery and Recovery Support].
184
About Us, SAMHSA, https://www.samhsa.gov/about-us (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
185
Id.
186
Recovery and Recovery Support, supra note 183.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
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capacity for reform and achieve a meaningful opportunity for release.192
Resilience is a key component to recovery and to success upon reentry into
the community. The ability to cope with adversity and adapt to change better
prepares individuals for the next stressful situation.193 Reintegration into the
community poses a variety of obstacles to becoming a meaningful,
contributing member of society; resilience is essential to this process.
Effective recovery goals focus not only on fostering health and resilience,
but also on reducing barriers to employment, education, and other life goals
through treatment, services, and community-based programs.194 Such
services have a demonstrated improvement on quality of life195 and
recidivism rates,196 further supporting the argument for considering
sentencing protocols that afford non-incorrigible offenders the opportunity
to reenter the community prior to the age of retirement.
Effective treatment programs consist of four basic principles. First,
treatment must directly address criminogenic factors, particularly dynamic
factors (changeable characteristics) directly associated with criminal
behavior, such as attitudes, thoughts, behaviors regarding employment,
education, peers, authority, substance abuse, and interpersonal
relationships.197 Second, programs must foster therapeutic integrity through
professionally tailored design and delivery.198 “Poorly implemented
programs delivered by untrained personnel, in which offenders spend only a
minimal amount of time, can hardly be expected to successfully reduce
recidivism.”199 Third, effective rehabilitation programs target offenders who
are at sufficient risk for recidivism so that reduction in recidivism rates is
measurable; the most intensive programs should be offered to offenders with
the highest risk of recidivism.200 “Many offenders are at low risk for future
recidivism” and treatment programs geared towards such offenders will have
minimal impact on future criminal activities because few of those offenders
would have recidivated anyway.201 The Grant decision is therefore a to
encourage rehabilitation-focused programs for non-incorrigible youth, as the
Third Circuit recognized that even youth who commit crimes worthy of
lengthy sentences are capable of rehabilitation and reform.202 It is this
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).
Recovery and Recovery Support, supra note 183.
Id.
Id.
Mackenzie, supra note 162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2018).
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population that needs rehabilitation services in order to effectuate a reduction
in rates of recidivism and incarceration.203 Lastly, effective treatments must
be delivered in “modes that address the learning styles and abilities of
offenders.”204 Several programs have been identified as those likely to
reduce recidivism, including cognitive behavioral therapy, community
employment programs, and vocational education programs.205
Recovery focuses on an individual’s strengths, abilities, resources, and
values; it is a holistic approach that addresses the whole person and the
surrounding community.206 Vocational rehabilitation practices mirror these
factors. Because gainful employment impacts all areas of an individual’s
life and wellness, effective vocational rehabilitation services could be crucial
to successful reentry.
A large portion of offenders with disabilities do not receive vocational
rehabilitation services.207 The psychological effects of being an ex-offender,
aside from the effects of disability, suggest the need for rehabilitation
counseling to assist transition into the community.208 It is not surprising,
therefore, that prisons that fail to provide vocational rehabilitation services
have high recidivism rates.209 Research suggests that this is a consequence
of depriving inmates of sufficient resources to develop the education and
skills necessary to become productive members of society.210 Without such
skills, individuals lose hope and motivation and tend to display chronic
criminal behavior.211
Vocational rehabilitation promotes higher rates of successful follow-up
with community-based services and lower rates of recidivism. It also
promotes wellness in each of the four dimensions of recovery: health, home,
purpose, and community. Work is a critical social role. It “provides
economic security, intellectual or physical challenge . . . friendships and . . .
helps to promote life satisfaction.”212 Further, work consumes more time
than any other activity, except for sleep.213 The importance of work does not
diminish with age; however, older individuals, and especially those with
203
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disabilities, have less success obtaining employment.214 Empirical evidence
supports the efficacy, clinical utility, and cost effectiveness of vocational
rehabilitation and its ability to help individuals with disabilities obtain
competitive employment.215 A sentencing framework that implements
vocational rehabilitation services should be presented to non-incorrigible
offenders who have been afforded lesser sentences, as both the individual
offender and society as a whole may benefit from meaningful contributions
to the workforce.
Rehabilitation counselors are central to the effective delivery of
vocational rehabilitation services, as counselors with graduate training in
rehabilitation counseling are moderately more effective than those without
graduate rehabilitation degrees.216 Strong empirical evidence supports the
efficacy of the working alliance and skills training as key factors in the
counseling process.217
Despite evidence suggesting that only a modest number of individuals
in vocational rehabilitation sustain competitive employment, around 40% of
individuals with psychiatric disabilities work steadily in competitive jobs
after engaging in vocational rehabilitation services.218 Research indicates
that significant non-monetary incentives exist for adults to maintain
employment as they age, such as greater social contact and support, greater
physical and mental activity, increased morale, a greater sense of purpose,
and increased life satisfaction.219 This evidence emphasizes the importance
of vocational rehabilitation in sentencing considerations and the prison
setting and demonstrates why services should be provided to incarcerated
individuals as early as possible. It might be argued that the Third Circuit
acknowledged that individuals are still afforded the opportunity “to attend to
other endeavors in life”220 after retirement, and therefore a meaningful
opportunity for release need not require the opportunity to reenter society
before retirement age. A meaningful opportunity for release, however, must
provide an offender with the opportunity to contribute productively to
society, a concept that inherently provides individuals with hope to reconcile
with society and achieve fulfillment.221 A chance to pursue meaningful work
is critical to that notion, and vocational rehabilitation services will aid in that
214
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effort.
2. An Argument for a Sentencing Protocol and Integrative
Transition Programs
Sentencing systems should include assessment, screening, and the
development of a time-sensitive rehabilitation plan. There is a recent trend
to adopt scientific screening and assessment tools to structure decisionmaking and identify the needs of juvenile offenders.222 “Competency
statutes and policies have become more research-based, and youth
interventions are evidence-based across a range of programs.”223 The social,
economic, and psychological role of work changes with age.224 For example,
there is an increased incidence of medical problems amongst older adults,
which may impact the ability to perform certain job functions.225 Individuals
require different levels of care; thus, an effective screening, assessment, and
treatment process is critical. A constitutional punishment must “fit[] the
offender and not merely the crime.”226
When youth must be placed in more restrictive settings in order to
receive basic mental health services, the likelihood of future delinquency
increases, as does criminal behavior and arrests as adults.227 As Supreme
Court decisions have indicated, the characteristics of the individual offender
and the circumstances surrounding the crime committed should enlighten
decision-makers at the sentencing stage. These factors should also indicate
the importance of treatment planning for efficient reintegration in order to
promote successful participation in the community as law-abiding citizens
upon release. For example, state prisoners with mental health diagnoses are
twice as likely as those without to have been homeless in the year before
their arrest,228 and local jail inmates with mental health diagnoses are three
times as likely to report a history of physical or sexual abuse.229 Encouraging
earlier releases for offenders capable of reform and rehabilitating those who
may return to the community at an age when work is a practical goal, 230
would not only help alleviate the recidivism problem, but would also
promote wellness among offenders and realize the Supreme Court’s goal of
ensuring a meaningful opportunity for release.
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Nearly half of all arrests occur within the first twelve months of release.
Thus, effective transition planning is essential. The time following release
is a critical time for healthcare and self-management interventions. Even
facilities that provide adequate treatment see those efforts derailed when
inmates are released without adequate discharge planning to transition their
care, or without financial or other supports. Universal integration of prerelease programs will decrease difficulties with finding employment, thus
increasing access to healthcare and other services. Research indicates that
the criminal justice system should collaborate with the community to more
effectively meet the needs of youth with mental health disorders.231
Evidence further shows that, although rehabilitation methods in secure
settings effectively change behavior within the setting, the skills do not
transfer to the community setting.232 The most effective models of treatment
include psychosocial interventions and an after-care plan with services to
help the offender transfer and maintain learned skills.233 Further, lower-risk
offenders are more negatively affected by incarceration.234 Conducting
thorough assessments at the sentencing phase and at intervals throughout the
incarceration period is therefore critical. Risk factors and capacity for
rehabilitation and reform must be identified and attended to in order to ensure
that incarceration does not negatively affect inmates, doing more harm than
good by increasing the likelihood of longer sentences (and the additional
financial burdens that go with it) as well as recidivism.235 Although the Third
Circuit was correct to encourage a sentencing scheme that contemplates
release before the age of retirement for non-incorrigible offenders, the court
did not go far enough. Promise of an earlier release, without efficient
services promoting success within the community, does not guarantee an
offender his or her best chance to achieve fulfillment outside prison walls.
The criminal justice system can impose high economic costs.236
Federal, state, and local governments spend about $68 billion on
incarceration each year.237 Additionally, increased life expectancies have
created a need for greater financial resources to support adults as they
continue to age.238 “The very difficult budget climate in states recently has
prompted questions about the effectiveness of punitive reforms and the high
economic costs they can impose.”239 States are seeking ways to produce
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better results for juvenile offenders at a lower cost.240 This has contributed
to a state legislative trend to realign fiscal resources from state institutions
toward more effective community-based services.241
Reducing the number of incarcerated non-violent offenders by half
could save taxpayers $16.9 billion annually without compromising public
safety.242 Additionally, the costs associated with treatment services are
lower than costs associated with long-term sentences that fail to adequately
deter future offenses.243 The financial benefit of adequate transition services
as part of treatment plans is also evident. For example, one study found that
one dollar spent on treatment in prison yields about six dollars of savings,
while a one dollar investment in community-based treatment yields about
twenty dollars in savings.244
There is a recent state trend to treat and rehabilitate youth in the juvenile
justice system rather than the more punitive-oriented adult system.245
Research shows that moving sixteen and seventeen year old youth out of the
adult system and into the juvenile system will return about three dollars in
benefits for every one dollar in cost.246 Additionally, extending the age limit
in juvenile court has the added benefit of affecting the lives of hundreds of
thousands of young individuals.247
It is a common (and understandable) argument that releasing offenders
has social costs, and that these costs must be weighed against the costs of
incarceration.248 Recidivism causes the criminal justice system to incur costs
related to arrests, hearings, court proceedings, and causes victims to incur
costs as the result of property loss or the need for additional security, for
example.249 It is unclear how to adequately calculate costs, as well as the
number of crimes prevented by incarceration; research suggests, however,
that the estimates of criminal activity will drastically differ if offenders are
given a sentence of community supervision.250 Others reject social cost
calculations and argue that the imputed costs of pain and suffering do not
take into account the suffering of offenders, or their partners, children, and
240
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communities.251 From this perspective, “cost-benefit assessments require
weighing inherently incommensurable values, and attempts to do so have
reached a dead-end . . . [and] that it may be more productive to compare the
costs and benefits of alternative crime prevention policies.”252 The financial
benefit, combined with the benefit of improving the health and wellness of
such a significant population within the nation, supports an argument for
shorter sentences for individuals that successfully engage in rehabilitation
programs and demonstrate capacity for reform.
VI. CONCLUSION
Successful reentry and maintenance of positive supports within the
community are essential to reduced rates of delinquent behavior and
recidivism. There is little evidence that confining youth does anything to
advance rehabilitative ideals. Instead, an overwhelming amount of evidence
indicates that incarceration is tremendously detrimental to the juvenile
offenders themselves, as well as the national society as a whole.
Developmental and social psychology indicate that children and adolescents
are inherently capable of positive reform, and thorough assessment,
rehabilitation, and transition services may promote rehabilitation among
offenders who commit even the most serious offenses. Incarceration,
however, remains the default response to juvenile crime. The Grant decision
was a step in the right direction to ensure that providing non-incorrigible
juvenile offenders with a meaningful opportunity for release based on
demonstrated ability for reform, can be done as effectively as possible in
view of the needs for each individual offender and society overall.
Recovery-oriented vocational rehabilitation services can elicit positive
change and prepare offenders to reenter the community and meaningfully
participate within the workforce, giving back to, rather than taking from,
society.
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